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Internally produced games outperform those produced by
outsourced developers in the U.S. video game industry
In the last two decades video games have grown into a multibillion dollar industry, with titles and
franchises that rival the film industry in terms of revenues. Ricard Gil takes a close look at how
producing a game in-house, rather than via a developer, can increase games’ consumer
performance. He argues that this stems from such ‘integrated’ games being perceived as being
higher quality, and being distributed more strategically. 
News outlets remind us daily about how talent and firm boundaries are constantly changing in
creative industries through a steady flow of mergers and acquisitions. These industries contrast
with other (more traditional) sectors in that they function as networks and that distributors acquire rights from
creators to distribute content on existing platforms. Since access to high quality content and network management
is of utmost importance for success, the acquisition of talent guarantees control over assets (human capital in
these industries) that produce in-house content and evaluate quality in arm’s length transactions.
Despite the fact that the study of the determinants of the boundaries of the firm has a long tradition in economics,
the study of contracting for innovation presents new challenges for academics as well as policy makers and
industry practitioners. The production function for innovation is unlikely to include tasks that are easy to specify
increasing both the costs of managing and outsourcing innovation. Understanding the trade-offs involved in
contracting for innovation becomes then very important from a managerial and policy perspectives as the
economy increasingly relies on these sectors.
The U.S. video game industry is a particularly good setting to study vertical integration in emerging, creative
industries. As of 2008, this industry experienced record sales of around $22 billion in the U.S. and more than $40
billion globally. As a result, competition intensified considerably between the three main platforms (Nintendo Wii,
Sony’s PS3 and Microsoft’s XBOX360). A direct consequence of the rapid sales growth and competition in this
industry has been that distributors of content (called publishers) have acquired an increasing amount of
successful independent developers in the pursuit of controlling key creative talent and develop the next hit game.
It is important to note that the video game market is considered to be a hit market because sales are very
concentrated on only a few extremely successful products. For example, in December of 2007, half a billion
dollars was spent on video games for the XBOX360. Out of these, more than $150 million was spent on only two
games.
This strategy is not in disagreement with the numbers. Our evidence shows that internally produced games are
associated with higher prices and higher sales than games outsourced to independent developers, even after
adjusting by demand seasonality (month and year), game fatigue (time since release) and potential market size
(platform customer base). If it is clear that internally produced games have higher demand, the question that we
must ask is why this is the case. We find the answer when we turn to industry structure and quality assurance
processes.
The genesis of a video game starts with the development of the game. Developers create video games while
publishers possess distribution rights of the game and are responsible for the manufacturing, marketing, market
research and advertising of the game. First-party developers are owned by a publisher whereas second-party
developers are independent developers that exclusively work for a specific publisher. An independent developer
contracts with a publisher receiving a combination of milestone payments and royalties. To make sure that
milestones are followed and deadlines are met, publishers assign producers (project managers) that monitor,
assist and coordinate actions with the developer. In a sense, meeting milestones help meeting deadlines and the
timely release of a video game in the market. If the developer is external (second or third-party), coordination with
the QA team (Quality Assurance) from the publisher is more costly than when the developer is internal. Because
game testing is done on special test equipment that is provided to developers and publishers by platform
companies, publishers that own platforms have lower costs of coordination with developers than publishers
coordinating with external developers and external platforms. In a nutshell, most games are developed in three
different types of firms that we show in Figure 1: solo developers (independent developers that need an external
publisher), integrated developers (firms that publish and develop games), and console companies (these are firms
that own a platform, publish and develop their own games).
Figure 1 – Organization Structures & Vertical Relationships between Developers and Publishers
Taking into account the structure and
processes in the industry, we
hypothesize that integrated games
outperform non-integrated games
because of three distinct channels: (1)
integrated games may be better than
non-integrated games and consumers
perceive them as of higher quality and
therefore have higher demand appeal;
(2) distributors of content may release
their internally produced games in
more profitable months; and (3)
distributors of content invest more
resources in promotional activities of
their own video games than
outsourced games. We test our
hypotheses using data from NPD, the
leading marketing data provider, on
monthly video game sales in the U.S.
between October 2000 and October
2007 (all video games and all
platforms in both the 6th and 7th
generation), and find evidence that
suggests that most of the difference in
performance is due to the first two channels: integrated games are inherently better and are released in
strategically more profitable months. According to our findings, marketing strategies after release appear to have
statistically negligible effects.
Although our findings provide a sensitive number of reasons behind the difference in performance between
integrated and independent games, the popular press has suggested three additional explanations for the
incidence of vertical integration and the wave of merger and acquisitions in creative industries that we are unable
to explore in our paper. First, network effects in these industries raise the marginal benefit of producing internal
content and therefore the willingness to pay for creative assets in companies that have access to potentially
bigger networks. Second, internal production of content may be cheaper (lower transaction and adaptation costs)
than outsourcing content development. Finally, a third alternative is that vertical integration and developer
acquisition is how large companies in this industry are able to attract and retain high-skill talent that is able to
evaluate outsourced content and produce future hits. A deeper understanding of the causes and consequences
for the accumulation of assets and talent in these industries is needed as antitrust and economic policies may be
able to hinder or foster technological innovation and diffusion, and consequently economic growth.
This article is based on the paper ‘Vertical Integration, Exclusivity, and Game Sales Performance in the US Video
Game Industry’, in the Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization.
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